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In the Universe, But Not Of the Universe?
I have a hard time rejecting causal determinism [1], which is essentially the idea that every result (including our choices and actions) depends on a chain-reaction of cause-and-effect relationships stretching back to the origin of the universe. And throwing a spirit into the equation doesn't seem to help because in Mormonism "all spirit is matter." So whatever that matter consists of, it will have laws that govern it. This leaves us with the prospect that our personalities, decisions, etc. are the combined chain of cause-and-effect relationships of physical and spiritual matter. This shouldn't be all that shocking in as much as our very existence is dependent on the existence of the universe (or multiverse, or whatever) and its laws and properties. If we have no right to exist apart from the universe, should we be shocked that everything we think and do is an extension of the universe?
But what people really seem to care about are issues of agency and responsibility. If we aren't truly making free choices (i.e. choices that are somehow not dependent on the configuration of matter in the universe--I guess), can we be held responsible for anything? And in a Mormon setting, what is the point of the plan of salvation if we are all simply acting out the consequences of the laws of the universe?
I have two responses to this [2]. First, as long as there are conscious beings with subjective experience, they will have a stake in regulating the behavior of other conscious beings. I don't want people stealing my stuff, for example, so laws and punishments are useful for deterring poor behavior and encouraging good. Second, if free will (i.e. the type that somehow makes decisions independent of the state of matter in the universe) does not exist, then we are all in the same boat--presumably including God [3]. There's no need to worry about Laplace's demon; he doesn't exist.
It seems to me that if causal-determinism is true, existence in the universe remains an unpredictable adventure [4], and we go right along on our merry way.
Notes:
1. ...which is different than saying I'm confident it is true.
2. I don't claim to have thought this through all the way. Whether by free will or determinism, I don't find the wrangling over definitions and thought experiments inherent in free will discussions to be worth my time and interest. I'm just giving you my two cents.
3. In Rational Theology, John A. Widtsoe wrote: "There can be no rational discussion of the details of God's life or nature. To him we give the most complete devotion, for to us he is in all respects infinite and perfect. His Godhood, however, was attained by the use of his power in simple obedience to the laws he discovered as he grew in experience." Maybe the universe favors the development of gods because they have a Darwinian advantage (i.e. scum bags are self-destructive).
4. Well, some things are predictable even now. I just mean that nobody can predict every detail of the course of the universe.
6 comments:
I think it unfortunate that we are taught that a Darwinian worldview must be somehow based in a Galilean worldview. There is teleology and normativity and nothing even close to the necessity of determinism in the former, while the latter is the exact opposite. It is only by way of some rather dubious philosophy that we will feel compelled to reduce the former to the latter.
I also can't help but point out the logical fallacy of saying "let's assume naturalistic determinism in order to do natural science; nature science works, therefore naturalistic determinism is true." That's like saying that if Jeff is a rabbit then he must be mortal; Jeff is mortal, therefore he must be a rabbit.
"And throwing a spirit into the equation doesn't seem to help because in Mormonism "all spirit is matter." So whatever that matter consists of, it will have laws that govern it."
I never thought of that.
I just tend to be skeptical causation is ontologically fundamental rather than an emergent property. Put in terms of classical physics I guess I still favor the Hamiltonian over the Newtonian conception of mechanics. There are just so many weird problems when you make causation fundamental.
Clark,
Would you mind expanding on the differences that you see between the Hamiltonian and Newtonian conceptions? While I do not take any conception of causation to be fundamental at all (I'm not that far off from Hume), would it be more accurate to say that Hamilton's view is more compatible with me than Newton?
Mathematically the Hamiltonian, Newtonian and (although I didn't mention it) the Lagrangian formulations are all the same. Conceptually Newton is bodies in causal interaction via forces. The Lagrangian is evolution due to nature minimizing potential energy. The Hamiltonian formulation is pretty similar in some ways to the Lagrangian. (It's actually the Legendre transform of the Lagrangian) The Lagrangian is typically used for simple systems whereas the Hamiltonian works better for complex systems. The Hamiltonian is the total energy of the system so the equation gives the time evolution of the energy of the system.
So conceptually Newton is object and causal forces, Lagrangian is minimizing potential energy, and Hamiltonian is evolution of the system energy. As you can see it's fairly easy to see one as fundamental and the others as emergent.
In Quantum Mechanics these get transformed. So the Hamiltonian becomes the Schrödinger or Dirac equation we introduce QM with and which for most people is the most "natural" way to think of it. However you can also do a Lagrangian form which lets you see symmetries better. Feynman diagrams in QED is effectively the Lagrangian form of QM. People still talk about the Newtonian form which s causal relations between particles. However in QM this is far less natural due to "virtual particles" and things get complex.
Dirac argued until his death that the Hamiltonian form was fundamental. Feynman, although he popularized the Lagrangian form, was an instrumentalist and thus thought metaphysical implications of equation was a rat hole we should avoid.
I should add that a criticism against looking at the Hamiltonian in this form is that it's really just the definition of energy. In other words we define energy as what is conserved under time translation. So to draw metaphysics from this is circular.
The Lagrangian is usually called the minimization of action and so the metaphysical idea is that of action. Likewise if action is so defined in terms of what is minimized then can we draw metaphysics from this?
I don't buy this criticism, although of course metaphysical arguments are nearly all extremely weak and more often than not a mere appeal to intuition.
I like focusing in terms of either H (total energy) or S (action) as in many ways it's a far more natural approach to mechanics (quantum or classical) than billiard balls and causes that we pick up from our experience in the macro world. If nothing else it at least means we should be careful about assuming bodies and causal forces are what are real and fundamental.
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