I finally finished reading Nonsense on Stilts: How to Tell Science from Bunk by Massimo Pigliucci. Pigliucci is an evolutionary biologist turned philosopher of science who is one of the main participants in the fine podcast Rationally Speaking. It turns out that science and bunk cannot be distinguished by hard and fast rules, but there are some guidelines. Along the way he examines examples of controversial science, clear pseudoscience, and other auxiliary phenomena such as the rise of think tanks and postmodern critiques of science.
The second chapter deals with the notion that there are so-called 'hard' sciences (e.g. physics) and 'soft' sciences (e.g. sociology). Physics, with its exactness and predictive power, is often held up as the ideal to which all other sciences should aspire. However, Pigliucci argues that the sciences are heterogeneous because they deal with different problems of different complexity, and that their methods reflect those differences. In this view, physics is not somehow better than, say, biology, it's just different.
Early in the chapter he discusses the concept of strong inference. This is where a crucial experiment can be used to rule out one or more mutually exclusive hypotheses. Essentially you set up a situation where either X or Y is true, and then perform an experiment to unambiguously rule one of them out. This kind of approach can work well in physics. However, although it is a very logical way to proceed, not all scientific questions are amenable to this method because of the complexity of the subject matter and because not all answers are black and white. (For example, you might find that many people with a disease show improvement with a particular drug. It's not a cure vs. no cure, nobody vs. everybody dichotomy.)
He then goes on to discuss historical sciences (e.g. geology, paleontology) which are sometimes maligned as having untestable theories. In this view, experimental findings are privileged above all else, and since you cannot perform experiments with past occurrences, those occurrences must remain unverifiable. (This is a common argument made by creationists seeking to cast doubt on evolution or anything else that contradicts their interpretation of the Bible). However, as Pigliucci points out, science is about more than doing experiments (e.g. astronomy), and drawing on work by Carol E. Cleland he argues that historical hypotheses can indeed be verified with a high degree of certainty. It's worth spending a moment on this.
A difference between historical and experimental sciences is captured in the philosophical (and certainly philosophical-sounding) term, asymmetry of overdetermination. This term simply refers to the difference in our ability to know cause and effect when looking into the future vs. the past. Cleland uses the example of a house fire: someone investigating a house fire may be able to determine that it was caused by a short circuit. This is because of all of the clues left behind after the event. However, that knowledge does not translate into the ability to predict whether a particular future short circuit will result in a fire. Similarly, police investigating a crime often have many clues with which to reconstruct what happened, but they cannot predict how and when a future crime might occur. On the other hand (my own interpretation), an instructor at a fire fighting school might be able to arrange things such that a short circuit reliably causes a fire, but this is because the instructor has eliminated variables that might prevent the fire from starting and constrained conditions to give a reliable result.
Historical sciences rely on the fact that historical occurrences leave behind many clues, only a few of which may be needed in order to establish the reality of the occurrence. Scientists in this mode of investigation look for 'smoking guns' from which they can infer what happened. Experimentalists, on the other hand, seek to limit variables that might interfere with the experiment in question--trying to eliminate false negatives and false positives. These constrained conditions allow them to make more precise predictions and measurements, but that precision can quickly disappear in a more complex context. It's also worth pointing out that these two approaches can be employed together such that they inform one another.
Cleland summarizes:
When it comes to testing hypotheses, historical science is not inferior to classical experimental science. Traditional accounts of the scientific method cannot be used to support the superiority of experimental work. Furthermore, the differences in methodology that actually do exist between historical and experimental science are keyed to an objective and pervasive feature of nature, the asymmetry of overdetermination. Insofar as each practice selectively exploits the differing information that nature puts at its disposal, there are no grounds for claiming that the hypotheses of one are more securely established by evidence than are those of the other.
Further reading:
Cleland, Carol E. (2001).
"Historical science, experimental science, and the scientific method," Geology 29, pp. 987-990.
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